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1964] RECENT DECISIONS 1071 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SUBPOENA OF NONRESIDENT 
CITIZEN AS WITNESS BEFORE GRAND JURY-Defendant, a nonresident citizen 
of the United States, was subpoenaed1 by a federal district court to appear 
before a grand jury investigating alleged fraud in the procurement of 
government contracts. Defendant having failed to appear, the district court 
issued an order directing him to show cause why he should not be held in 
contempt. On appeal from a judgment holding defendant in contempt,2 
held, reversed, one judge dissenting in part. The power of a federal district 
court to subpoena a nonresident citizen is limited to the actual trial of a 
criminal action. United States v. Thompson, 319 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1963). 
The effect of the redrafting of the Walsh Act3 in the 1948 revision of 
the Federal Judicial Code was the sole issue of significance in the principal 
case. As enacted, the Walsh Act empowered the federal courts to subpoena 
1 In conformity with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1783(b) (1958), the subpoena 
Wall personally served on defendant by the American Vice-Consul in the Philippines, and 
a first-class round trip ticket and travel expenses tendered. 
2 In re Thompson, 213 F. Supp. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
3 Walsh Act of 1926, ch. 762, § 2, 44 Stat. 835; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 
(1932). 
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nonresident citizens as witnesses at the "trial of any criminal action."~ 
Section 1783 of the revised Judicial Code permits the issuing of a subpoena 
for attendance at a "criminal proceeding."5 While it is clear that the 
original provision was not intended to apply to a grand jury proceeding, 
the term "criminal proceeding" incorporated in the revision is arguably of 
wider scope.6 Since the issue turns on a narrow question of statutory inter-
pretation, initial consideration must be given to the revisers' notes which 
accompany the text of the Judicial Code. Commenting on the general 
policies under which the revisers worked, the chief reviser wrote: 
"[N]o changes of law or policy will be presumed from changes of 
language in revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly 
expressed. Mere changes of phraseology indicate no intent to work a 
change of meaning but merely an effort to state in clear and simpler 
terms the original meaning of the statute revised. Congress recognized 
this rule by including in its reports the complete Revisers' Notes to 
each section in which are noted all instances where change is intended 
and the reasons therefor."7 
To understand the subtle significance of the chief reviser's statement, com-
parison must be made to the well settled rule of construction of revised 
statutes and codifications unaccompanied by explanatory notes. Changes 
in phraseology do not import a substantive change of law or policy "unless 
the intent of the legislature to alter the law is evident or the language of 
the new act is palpably such as to require a different construction."8 The 
chief reviser would demand not only that the change of law be manifest 
in the language of the revision, but that it be specifically acknowledged in 
the notes. In the notes following section 1783 there is in fact no mention 
of the change in phraseology at issue. However, the original language of 
the Walsh Act succinctly and unambiguously limited the subpoena power 
of the federal courts over nonresident citizens to the actual trial of a 
4 "Whenever the attendance at the trial of any criminal action of a witness, being a 
citizen of the United States, or domiciled therein, who is beyond the jurisdiction of the 
United States, is desired by the Attorney General or any assistant or district attorney 
acting under him, the judge of the court before which such action is pending ••• may, 
upon a proper showing, order that a subpoena issue • • • commanding such witness to 
appear before the said court •••• " Walsh Act of 1926, ch. 762, § 2, 44 Stat. 835. 
5 "A court of the United States may subpoena, for appearance before it, a citizen 
or resident of the United States who ... is beyond the jurisdiction of the United States 
and whose testimony in a criminal proceeding is desired by the Attorney General." 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1783(a) (1958). 
6 In two previous cases, a district court has exercised its alleged power under § 1783 
to subpoena nonresident citizens before a federal grand jury, holding them in contempt 
upon failure to appear. United States v. Stem, No. Mll-188, S.D.N.Y. 1957, appeal dismissed, 
249 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 919 (1958); United States v. Leff, Docket 
143/309, S.D.N.Y. 1954. 
7 Barron, The Judicial Code, 1918 Revision, 8 F.R.D. 439, 445-46 (1949). (Emphasis 
added.) 
a Principal case at 669. (Emphasis added.) See United States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729, 
740 (1884); Barron, supra note 7, at 446-48, and cases collected therein. 
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criminal action. The failure of the language employed in section 1783 to 
clarify the original in any way is apparent. The change in phraseology 
therefore cannot reasonably be characterized as merely an attempt at clari:6.-
cation.9 Viewed with the original language of the Walsh Act in mind, the 
language of section 1783 clearly evidences an intention to increase the scope 
of the courts' subpoena power. At the same time, however, the revisers' notes 
purport to deny any such intention by omitting reference to the change in 
phraseology. 
The majority opinion in the principal case avoided the ultimate issue 
by isolating the phrase "criminal proceeding."10 By reference to decisions 
interpreting the phrase in other contexts,11 and without reference to the 
original language of the Walsh Act, the court found the expression "criminal 
proceeding"-and thus the language of section 1783-"at best, ambigu-
ous."12 The absence of notation of the change in phraseology was thus 
deemed controlling.13 Had the issue been properly framed in terms of a 
conflict between the results dictated by the language of section 1783 (viewed 
in the light of the Walsh Act's original language)14 and the revisers' notes, 
the former would almost certainly have prevailed despite the chief reviser's 
contentions to the contrary.15 
In evaluating the magnitude of the law enforcement problem created 
by the majority, opinion, it is important to understand that, had its deci-
sion been otherwise, significant problems would nevertheless have remained. 
The Walsh Act is in its very conception inadequate, for law enforcement 
problems occasioned by a witness' flight beyond the territorial borders of 
the United States admit of solution only through the enlistment of foreign 
judicial aid, presumably by bilateral international agreement.16 The Walsh 
Act, however, is unilateral in design. The United States has the power, 
o Principal case at 671 (dissenting opinion of Kaufman, J.). 
10 Id. at 668. 
11 E.g., In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957); Post v. United States, 161 U.S. 583, 587 
(1896); Mullony v. United States, 79 F.2d 566, 578-80 (1st Cir. 1935). But see Cobbledick v. 
United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66 (1906). 
12 Principal case at 668. 
13 Id. at 669-70. 
14 Cf. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228 (1956). 
115 The revisers' notes are "authoritative in perceiving the meaning of the Code .... " 
United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78, 81 (1949). However, the absence of 
notation of changes in phraseology should not be conclusive of legislative intent where 
a substantive change is clearly reflected in the alteration of the statute itself. Though 
numerous cases have quoted approvingly from Barron, supra note 7, reference to the 
revisers' notes has been made only upon a determination that the language of the 
statute itself was ambiguous. E.g., Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., supra note 14; 
Glenn v. United States, 231 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 926 (1956). "[T]here 
is no need to refer to the legislative history where the statutory language is clear." Ex 
parte Collette, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1948) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1948)); see Con-
tinental Cas. Co. v. United States, 314 U.S. 527, 530 (1942); Bate Refrigerating Co. v. 
Sulzberger, 157 U.S. I, 45 (1895); United States v. Bowen, 100 U.S. 508, 513 (1880). 
16 See generally Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a 
Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953); Mueller, International Judicial Assistance 
in Criminal Matters, 7 VILL. L. REv. 193 (1962). 
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inherent in its sovereignty, to require nonresident citizens to return to this 
country whenever the public interest demands.17 In fact, reliance is placed 
solely on the coercive effect of the courts' subpoena power. Where the wit-
ness has no property in the United States to satisfy a contempt decree inci-
dent to his refusal to answer a subpoena,18 that decree has little coercive 
effect. A more effective device might be statutory revocation of the passport 
upon failure to comply with a subpoena. 
Nonetheless, within the present framework of the Walsh Act, the un-
availability of nonresident citizens to testify before grand juries should 
occasion less frequent problems than might seem the case. The considera-
tions applicable to the problem of securing witnesses before an investigating 
grand jury are wholly different from those applicable to the problem of 
securing witnesses before a trial court. The significance of the courts' sub-
poena power in the latter case arises from the right of confrontation which 
the sixth amendment affords the accused in a criminal prosecution and the 
rules regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence. Hearsay alone, how-
ever, even where it would be clearly incompetent before a petit jury, can 
legally support a grand jury indictment where a witness possessed of 
immediate knowledge is unavailable to testify.19 
Should Congress consider legislation remedial of the instance where a 
nonresident citizen is alone possessed of evidence indispensable to the 
securing of an indictment, provision might profitably be made for the taking 
of depositions or the issuing of letters rogatory20 as a discretionary alterna-
tive to the courts' increased subpoena powers.21 If and to the extent that 
foreign law permits such procedures,22 provision might be made for cases 
in which the witness is unable to comply with a subpoena because of illness 
or substantial hardship.2a 
Andre A. Schwartz 
17 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); cf. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 
273, 281 (1918). 
18 28 u.s.c. § 1784 (1958). 
19 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
20 While 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1958) provides the procedure for the issuance of letters 
rogatory or a commission to take depositions, there exists no provision enabling federal 
courts to issue letters rogatory or take depositions for grand jury proceedings. 
21 The validity of an indictment depends on the rational persuasiveness of the evidence 
before the grand jury, rather than on its trial competence. Costello v. United States, 221 
F.2d 668, 677-79 (2d Cir.), afj'd, 350 U.S. 359, 364-65 (1956) (concurring opinion of Burton, 
J.). In view of Costello and the ex parte nature of grand jury proceedings, it seems 
doubtful than an indictment would be held to have been improperly returned if supported 
solely by evidence secured by deposition or letters rogatory, even where the sixth amend• 
ment right of confrontation would render such evidence incompetent before a petit 
jury. See generally Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 111 (1948); Note, 65 YALE L.J. 390 (1956). 
22 See Jones, supra note 16, at 518-34; Mueller, supra note 16, at 202•15. 
23 As was alleged by the defendant in the principal case. Principal case at 666. 
